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This article introduces the contributions of this special issue on modelling of urban road 
pricing and its implementation. The issue focuses on the design of urban road pricing 
schemes, and their spatial and temporal impacts, using quantitative transport (and land use) 
models. The policy implications of road pricing, including welfare and equity aspects, are 
studied for Paris, Brussels and Oslo using state of the art planning models. The issue is 
completed with a study of public acceptability and the upcoming road-pricing trial in 
Stockholm, and a review paper on the history of thought and future prospects of road pricing.  
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1.     Introduction 
 
The core of this special issue on “Modelling Urban Road Pricing Implementation” is the study 
of the design and impacts of urban road pricing schemes using quantitative transport models. 
In this issue, the effects of road pricing are studied for four European cities (Paris, Brussels 
and Oslo) using state-of-the-art models that differ in their spatial and temporal resolution and 
in the dimensions of travel behaviour that they treat endogenously. The issue is completed 
with a study of public acceptability and the upcoming road-pricing trial in Stockholm, and a 
review paper on the history of thought and long-term prospects of road pricing.  
 
In a recent Transport Policy paper, Prud’homme and Bocarejo (2005) used a simple 
diagrammatic model to cast serious doubts on the economic benefits of the London congestion 
charge. Mackie (2005) responded by pointing to the simplicity of the back of the envelope 
model and the choice of basic parameter values including values of time. This interchange 
illustrates the need for a careful ex ante study of the economics of urban road pricing. An ex 
ante study has to consider at least two dimensions: what level of sophistication in pricing 
instruments is used and what is the optimal time sequence for the introduction of pricing 
schemes. These dimensions are incorporated into the concept of an implementation path that 
specifies what type of pricing scheme (e.g. cordon, time differentiation) is introduced and 
when, and which accompanying measures (e.g. public transport, toll revenue use) are needed. 
 
Most of the papers of this special issue originate from the MC-ICAM research project of the 
European Commission. The main goal of MC-ICAM was to study alternative hypothetical 
implementation paths using advanced transportation models. MC-ICAM analysed both urban 
and interurban road pricing, but the literature suggests that current pricing inefficiencies are 
more pronounced in urban than in non urban areas (see, e.g. Proost et al., 2002). This special 
issue is devoted exclusively to pricing in urban areas. 
 
The remainder of this introductory article is organised as follows. In Section 2, we explain 
some background concepts, and in Section 3 we briefly present five case studies treated in this 
issue. Four of the studies deal with implementation paths of road pricing (Paris, Brussels, Oslo 
and Helsinki
1) and were part of the MC-ICAM project. A fifth study (Stockholm) assesses the 
impact of road tolling and public transport enhancements on political acceptability of road 
pricing. Section 4 summarises the main lessons drawn from the case studies. Finally, to help 
to put in perspective the case studies featured in this special issue, we provide in Section 5 a 
brief review of the current state of urban road-pricing practice.  
 
A related special issue on urban road pricing appeared in 2002 in Transport Policy. That issue 
concerned theoretical studies, existing tolling schemes and mainly non European applications, 
whereas the current special issue focuses on Europe only, on potential rather than existing 
pricing schemes and on long-run implementation paths. Moreover, this issue illustrates the 
application of large-scale urban models in ex ante studies.  
 
Other collections of studies on road pricing can be found in Santos (2004) and in de Palma 
and Quinet (2005). Both these contributions have a broader focus than does this special issue.  
 
                                                 
1 The Helsinki case study is not included as a separate article in the special issue.   3  
2.     Implementation paths, economic optima, barriers and constraints  
In economics it is well known that free access to public roads can generate a misallocation of 
resources. The fundamental reason behind this phenomenon is a so-called external effect: if 
there is congestion, each trip on the road forces other users to slow down and therefore to 
experience longer trip times. In the absence of a toll, a driver does not have to pay for the 
additional costs he imposes on others. The situation can be improved by corrective policy 
measures such as road pricing. Rouwendal and Verhoef (2005) in this special issue introduce 
the key economic concepts of road pricing, including marginal cost pricing, external costs, 
marginal cost of public funds, and first and second best. 
 
There are many potential reasons why a first-best road tolling scheme is not implemented 
once and for all, and why instead a gradual approach is necessary. Barriers that prevent an 
immediate and complete optimisation can be classified as technical and practical, legal and 
institutional, and acceptability-related barriers These barriers can be translated into constraints 
for policy makers on the coverage of the policy, the composition and levels of charges, the 
degree of differentiation of charges, the use of the revenues and on the possibility to utilise 
supplementary policies. An implementation path is a temporal sequence of policy measures, 
satisfying the constraints at each stage that strives to reach or approach a first-best optimum in 
the most efficient way.  
 
Rouwendal and Verhoef use a simple illustrative numerical simulation model to demonstrate 
the different dimensions of an implementation path. Their simulation study bridges the gap 
between theoretical analysis and issues that arise in actual transportation policy, and serves as 
an introduction to the full-scale simulation models that are featured in the four urban transport 
case studies.  
 
3.     Five urban transport models  
In this issue four studies from the MC-ICAM project deal with hypothetical implementation 
paths for urban road pricing in four European cities, and one study deals with the political 
acceptability of a road pricing proposal for Stockholm that will be implemented in 2006. 
 
To assess the implementation paths of road pricing in the first four studies, different state-of-
the-art simulation tools are used. These models provide a finer level of detail, and operate 
under more comprehensive and realistic assumptions, than is possible at either the conceptual 
stage of analysis or with analytical models. The models also facilitate consideration of 
political, institutional, legal, and psychological barriers to the implementation of marginal cost 
pricing (MCP). Welfare effects of alternative pricing policies are also reported. 
 
As summarised in Table 1, the four implementation-path case studies are similar in a number 
of respects. They are all concerned with large cities in Western Europe (Paris, Brussels, Oslo 
and Helsinki). They all examine a phased sequence of implementation in which constraints on 
the set of pricing instruments and accompanying policy measures (specific to each city) are 
progressively relaxed. Both the sets of instruments and the constraints are treated as exogenous 
at each phase. The studies also differ in a number of features: the models used, the dimensions 
of user behaviour that are endogenous, whether land-use decisions are considered, the level of 
detail in which road and public transit networks are represented, the set of policy instruments 
considered, and the accuracy with which optimal first-best or second-best policies can (and 
are) computed.  
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de Palma and Lindsey (XX) in this issue use the dynamic network equilibrium model 
METROPOLIS to study road pricing in the Ile-de-France region which contains Paris. In 
METROPOLIS, individual choices of mode, departure time and route are endogenous. This 
tool is similar to micro-simulation models in that it tracks the progress of every vehicle from 
origin to destination, although some microscopic details such as lane changes and congestion 
at intersections are not featured. Unlike micro-simulation models, METROPOLIS can handle 
large networks with modest data requirements, and can undertake dynamic simulations (with a 
time step in the order of one minute) over a full day at reasonable speed in terms of 
computation time. 
 
The main focus of the simulations is to assess the efficiency gains of link-based and road 
cordon tolling, as well as a time-based tax. The simulations are used to construct an 
advantageous sequence of policy packages as MCP is progressively phased in. Emphasis is 
placed on evaluating and ranking alternative second-best pricing policies.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE  
 
Proost and Sen (XX) use the TRENEN strategic model to study pricing of transport in 
Brussels. The case study focuses on two types of difficulties that arise in the design and 
execution of optimal implementation paths for MCP. This case study examines first which 
instruments can contribute most to a more efficient transport situation. The pricing policies 
considered are more efficient parking pricing, improved public transport pricing, and an 
optimal road cordon toll. The second type of difficulty that is examined arises with multiple 
levels of government that differ in their objectives and political powers. For example, local 
governments may assign lower weights to the welfare of non-residents than do national 
governments. Cost of funds may differ because of differences in the types and levels of taxes 
that governments rely on for revenue. And control of various pricing and non-pricing policy 
instruments may be divided up between levels of government. All these differences create the 
potential for conflict, as well as strategic behaviour in the form of “tax exporting”, “tax 
competition”, etc. (see De Borger and Proost, 2004). 
  
To explore these dimensions of intergovernmental relationships it is assumed that the city 
government chooses the level of parking fees inside Brussels, while power to set the cordon 
toll resides with the regional government — which has authority over a wider population that 
includes Brussels. The city government is concerned about the total welfare of its inhabitants, 
while the regional government cares about the welfare of both the inhabitants and commuters 
to Brussels. A Stackelberg equilibrium (with the regional government as leader) and a Nash 
equilibrium are computed, and the results compared with the full optimum solution where the 
central government level would control all the instruments.  
 
In the Oslo case study, Vold (XX) uses the RETRO model to study passenger transport and 
land use in the Greater Oslo area. RETRO is a disaggregated network equilibrium model for 
passenger transport. It includes sub models for residential location, workplace location and car 
ownership decisions. It is coupled with optimisation algorithms to determine the optimal 
levels of policy instruments. 
 
Marginal cost transport pricing for Oslo is implemented in a phased manner by initially 
applying second-best pricing measures for the region, and then gradually refining the 
instruments towards first-best MCP. RETRO is capable of forecasting the short- and long-  5  
term effects of first- and second-best MCP, and in this respect it is suited to analysing a 
phased implementation path. 
 
For Helsinki an interactive land-use and transport model based on the MEPLAN modelling 
framework is used. MEPLAN encompasses all eight major subsystems of urban regions: 
transport networks, land use, workplaces, housing, employment, population, goods transport, 
and passenger transport. It also incorporates five levels of behaviour: workplace location, 
residential location, auto ownership, travel mode, and route; and a relatively detailed 
representation of the road network and system of transit lines. 
 
The analysis is focused on the inter-sectoral implications of transport policies - including 
land-use constraints and effects on the general economy of the region - rather than just on 
transportation. Cost-benefit accounts are drawn up relative to a business-as-usual or “do-
minimum” reference scenario. Policies are assumed to be in operation in year 2000, and 
evaluated over a 30-year period. A stepping model with five-year increments enables analysis 
of temporal phasing of policies. Policy packages are chosen from a broad range of pricing 
measures: link-based tolls, zone and distance-based congestion pricing, city centre and outer 
ring cordon charges, parking charges, and fuel taxation 
 
Finally
2, Armelius and Hultkrantz (XX) study the full-scale road pricing trial that will be 
performed in Stockholm from January to July 2006. As in London, the road tolls are presented 
as part of a package that includes major improvements of public transport, in particular by 
extension of bus services. This trial will be followed by a local referendum in September 2006 
that will decide on whether to make the system permanent or not. The authors use an 
aggregate modal choice model to study the likely impact of road tolling and public transport 
enhancements. The model is calibrated on traffic count data collected in Stockholm and 
demonstrates that designated measures to improve public transport can have a substantial 
influence on the probability for acceptance of road tolls. They also study the effects on 
acceptability of the redistribution of part of the toll revenue.  
 
4.     Summary and assessment of the case study approaches: directions for 
future research 
In the article following the case studies, de Palma, Lindsey and Niskanen (XX) review and 
compare the results of the four MC-ICAM project case studies as well as the illustrative 
numerical simulation model of Rouwendal and Verhoef (XX). They discuss the transferability 
of the results and assess the weak and strong points of the different modelling approaches 




  Efficiency gains from pricing increase with the proportion of a transport network that is 
priced (Paris). If only a small fraction of the network is tolled, tolls need to be set at 
relatively low levels in order to avoid extensive traffic diversion to untolled alternative 
routes, and the potential efficiency gains are inherently quite limited. 
                                                 
2 This study was not part of the MC-ICAM research consortium and the model is not designed to study 
implementation paths with the same degree of detail as the other four case studies.  
3 This list is based on MC-ICAM, Deliverable 7, http://www.strafica.fi/mcicam/handouts/DELIVERABLES/d7-
jan4-04.pdf    6  
 
  Greater efficiency gains derive from measures that are more finely differentiated with 
respect to mode, location, time (Paris, Brussels), and vehicle characteristics (Brussels), 
and so on. 
 
  The welfare gain from a package of policy measures can be equal to, greater than, or 
smaller than the sum of the gains from the individual package components. For example, 
the gains from tolling several routes are approximately additive if the routes are located 
far apart so that traffic spill-over effects between routes are minimal (as in Paris). By 
contrast, diseconomies in benefits can obtain for pricing parking and public transport 
(Brussels) or for congestion tolls (Oslo). 
 
  An implementation path may not progress monotonically. Prices can first rise and later fall, 
or fall first and then rise (Brussels). And users can gain in the early phases of 
implementation, but lose later on (Oslo) or vice versa. 
 
  Welfare losses can result from lack of coordination between levels of government that 
control different policy instruments. The extent of the inefficiency depends on how much 
their jurisdictions overlap, and can be alleviated by changing the sharing rules for revenue 
(Brussels). 
 
  Investing in additional transport infrastructure capacity may help to gain acceptability for 
pricing measures, but it is not justifiable on efficiency grounds unless there is adequate 
demand to use the capacity. Because marginal-cost pricing generally boosts transit 
ridership at the expense of auto travel, investments in public transport tend to be more 
justifiable than road investments (Helsinki). 
 
  The direction of land use effects can vary with the policy measure used. For example, 
residents and employers may choose to move away from a toll ring (both inwards and 
outwards) whereas link-based tolling induces them to concentrate towards the city centre 
(Oslo). The impacts of land use in the Helsinki and Oslo studies proved to be broadly 
similar in percentage terms. While the percentages may not seem particularly large, they 
might still tilt the balance of a cost-benefit analysis towards or against a pricing initiative.  
 
Armelius and Hultkrantz find that investing in additional transport infrastructure capacity may 
help to gain acceptability for pricing measures (Stockholm), but it is not justifiable on 
efficiency grounds unless there is adequate demand to use the capacity. More precisely, they 
find that road tolling may be more acceptable when the share of public transit is already high 
and the proceeds of the road tolls are returned to them via public transport improvements. 
 
The four studies of implementation paths can be considered as a test of the capabilities of 
models to assess ex ante road pricing implementation paths. There is clearly a considerable 
gap between an idealised approach, and what is feasible in applied modelling work using 
large-scale empirical network models. The four urban case studies sought an optimal 
compromise between the theoretically ideal approach and a pragmatic approach. The results 
are indicative of what one might expect to encounter along a realistic implementation path, 
but the implementation paths assumed are unlikely to represent the best possible path given 
the local circumstances. The contribution of the case studies – and of the underlying MC-  7  
ICAM project – is only a first step towards a more rigorous approach to the economic analysis 
of transport policy implementation issues. 
 
In the concluding article of this special issue, Pahaut and Sikow (XX) return to the Pigou – 
Knight debate that is at the heart of the road tolling issue. Are governments indeed capable of 
implementing new pricing systems and do they use the revenues properly? How do they deal 
with the redistributive issue that is unavoidable in any pricing reform?  
 
Over the last 10 years, one of the major supporters for marginal cost pricing in transport has 
been the European Commission. Pahaut and Sikow report on the policy developments on this 
front as this will probably steer the developments in the next decade in Europe. 
 
5.     Existing road-pricing schemes 
To help put in perspective the urban road-pricing case studies featured in this special issue, it 
is instructive to examine how urban road pricing has been implemented, and evolved, in 
practice worldwide. This section reviews the four most prominent schemes to date: 
Singapore’s schemes, the Norwegian toll rings, the US High Occupancy Toll lane projects, 
and London’s congestion charge. All of these schemes have some history that can be 
interpreted (heroically) as the first steps along an implementation path. And collectively they 
present a range of technological and other features. Their main features are presented in Table 
2.
4 We first present briefly their history and then link the experience to our research questions 
and findings.  
 
History 
Singapore: The history of road pricing in Singapore spans three decades. The Area Licensing 
Scheme (ALS), introduced in 1975, was limited to a restricted zone (RZ) within the CBD. A 
daily paper license was required for entry to the RZ and enforcement was by visual 
inspection. In 1995 a paper-based Road Pricing Scheme (RPS) was introduced as a transitory 
measure to familiarise drivers with link charging on arterial roads and expressways with 
payment required for each passage rather than only once daily. Charges on the links and for 
entry to the RZ were automated when Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) began in 1998. Toll 
rates have remained relatively constant under ERP, but charging has been progressively 
extended over the road network. 
 
Norway: Toll financing of road infrastructure projects in Norway dates back to 1929, and 
following tradition the toll rings were originally established to generate revenues rather to 
manage demand. The first two rings in Bergen (1986) and Oslo (1990) featured flat tolls, 
discounts for pass holders, and ceilings on the number of charged crossings per day or per 
month. Modest time-of-day variations were adopted in Trondheim (1991), and the single 
cordon there was replaced in 1996 by a system with six zones in order to boost revenues and 
enhance equity by extending charges to more drivers. Toll revenues were initially earmarked 
largely for roads, but amendments to the Road Acts in the mid-1990s now permit expenditure 
on public transport, environmental quality and safety. There is also increasing emphasis on 
demand management, as is evident in Oslo with the funding scheme Oslo package 2 that was 
introduced in 2002, and the possibility under discussion of implementing a new road pricing 
                                                 
4 Table 1 is compiled from a number of sources. The main references are Chin (2002), Goh (2002) and 
Santos et al. (2004) for Singapore; Tretvik (2003) and Ramjerdi et al. (2004) for Norway; DeCorla-
Souza (2004) and Value pricing home page (2005) for the US; and Transport for London (2005) and 
Mackie (2005) for London.   8  
scheme designed for congestion relief. 
 
High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes: US federal legislation passed in the 1990s established a 
Value Pricing Pilot Program to fund innovative road and parking pricing measures for 
congestion relief. The most prominent types of measure implemented so far are High 
Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes. HOT lanes are a variant of High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) 
lanes that allow vehicles that do not meet occupancy requirements to use the lanes for a toll. 
Five HOT facilities are in operation: SR-91 and I-15 in California, I-10 and US 290 in 
Houston, and I-394 in Minneapolis. General-purpose toll-free lanes run in parallel with the 
HOT lanes on all these facilities. On SR-91 tolls vary hourly according to a predetermined 
schedule, whereas on I-15 and I-394 tolls are adjusted dynamically every few minutes to 
maintain high flows. A number of studies of SR-91 and I-15 have documented how time-of-
day pricing influences ride-sharing, lane choice, trip-timing and other dimensions of traveller 
behaviour. More HOT lane projects are under development or have been proposed, including 
networks of HOT lane roads. 
 
London: Serious planning for road pricing in London began in 1998 with the Road Charging 
Options for London (ROCOL) study. Congestion pricing was introduced on February 17, 
2003, as a flat daily charge of ₤5 for moving a vehicle or parking on public space within a 21 
km
2 area around the city centre. The charge applies from 7:00-18:30 on weekdays. A number 
of vehicle categories are exempt, and residents of the charge area receive a 90% discount. 
Payment can be made in several ways. Vehicles are detected by Automatic Number Plate 
Recognition technology, but confirmation of payment is labour-intensive and system-
operating costs are high. Violations are relatively frequent, and penalties for late payment 
generate considerable revenues. On July 4, 2005, the charge was raised to ₤8, and there are 




From this brief and selective survey it is clear that urban road-pricing schemes differ along 
several dimensions including the type of tolling (facility or area-based), degree of time 
variation, types of exemptions and discounts, charging and enforcement technology, operating 
costs as a fraction of toll revenues, etc. But there are also important similarities across the four 
schemes considered (as well as other urban road-pricing projects). With the exception of the 
Norwegian toll rings congestion relief has been the official goal, but improved environmental 
quality is promoted as an additional benefit and revenue generation is likely to be a motivating 
factor behind increases in toll levels. All schemes feature some toll differentiation in the form 
of exemptions or discounts according to vehicle type, personal characteristics or vehicle 
occupancy. 
 
All the schemes are part of policy packages of instruments designed to enhance 
public/political acceptability and to provide additional degrees of freedom to meet objectives. 
In most cases revenues are earmarked for transportation or environmental initiatives. In 
Norway each toll ring was linked to a well-defined package of road infrastructure 
improvements, and the benefits became apparent soon after the scheme was introduced. 
Singapore is an exception in not earmarking toll revenues. However, Singapore is notable in 
terms of the extensive array of measures that have been used, even before the ALS was   9  
introduced, to improve transport generally and public transport service in particular.
5 
 
As far as the histories of the schemes it would be rash to suggest that each has progressed 
along a predetermined – let alone optimal – implementation path. Moreover, the histories of 
the HOT lane projects and London’s congestion charging schemes are very limited. 
Nevertheless, the developments that have occurred are generally consistent with the notion of 
a gradual sequence of steps towards increasingly extensive and sophisticated systems. In 
Singapore the shift from ALS to ERP represented a quantum leap in technology that permitted 
finer differentiation of charges with respect to time and space. Both the ALS and ERP have 
been repeatedly fine-tuned with respect to the timing and levels of charges, and changes that 
were judged to be counterproductive were later retracted. Norway has persevered with toll 
rings since the Bergen ring was introduced in 1986, but evolution is apparent in terms of a 
shift from manual to electronic collection, changes in the structure of tolls towards demand 
management, and more flexible rules for allocating revenues. 
 
The US Value Pricing Pilot Program was designed to encourage experimentation, and more 
than 30 projects with a wide range of facility types have been funded to date. HOT lane 
projects have proceeded the most rapidly, arguably because of their relatively small set-up and 
operating costs, and the fact that parallel toll-free lanes enhance acceptability. The existing 
HOT facilities differ as far as their vehicle occupancy requirements, whether tolls are set 
according to a predetermined schedule or dynamically, allocation of revenues and the degree 
of private-sector involvement.
6 The only significant change to London’s scheme so far is the 
fee increase from ₤5 to ₤8. Assessments vary as to whether the original ₤5 fee approximated a 
second-best congestion toll for the charge area.
7 An increase in the fee is consistent on simple 
second-best principles (Verhoef et al., 1996) with the planned expansion of the charge area, 
but acceptability and other considerations are likely to influence how the scheme evolves. 
 
It may seem from the above discussion that, despite the recent political support, Europe is not 
the forerunner when it comes to urban road pricing. Indeed, Singapore is the world leader. 
The US may also appear to be ahead of Europe in two respects: the number of experiments 
that are underway or planned, and the fineness of time variation and use of 
dynamic/responsive pricing on two facilities. But the US was slow to start: the first scheme, 
SR 91, began only in 1995. And the schemes are all facility based, and small in scope 
compared to Norway and London. 
 
This review of existing projects shows that long-run implementation paths were not 
announced ab initio. The sequence of steps that are now apparent in Singapore and Norway 
are probably the outcome of a series of incremental decisions by the officials who were in 
charge at the time. This means that well developed ex ante modeling exercises are a necessary 
step, but by no means sufficient for a successful implementation of road pricing.  
 
                                                 
5 To meet its demand management goals according to marginal-cost pricing principles, Singapore has 
been shifting from reliance on fixed vehicle charges towards variable charges – including not only tolls 
but also fuel taxes and parking charges. As Goh (2002, p.30) remarks “Singapore has always sought to 
make the case against congestion through economic terms … as long as motorists are prepared to pay 
the full social cost of their driving, they can drive as much as they want.” 
6 SR-91 was privately financed, and privately operated until January, 2003. Ownership was then 
transferred to a public authority due to growing congestion on the untolled lanes and a “non-compete” 
clause in the private contract that precluded capacity improvements to the freeway until 2030. 
7 See Shaffer and Santos (2004), Prud’homme and Bocajero (2005) and Mackie (2005).   10  
6.     Conclusions 
 
What did we learn about implementation paths of urban road pricing? The four modelling 
studies (Paris, Brussels, Oslo and Helsinki) of urban road pricing implementation showed that 
there is clearly a considerable gap between an idealised approach (which is difficult to 
formulate mathematically – let alone to solve analytically or numerically), and what is 
feasible in applied modelling work using large-scale empirical network models and taking 
into account city/country-specific barriers and constraints. The contribution of the case studies 
is only a first step towards a more rigorous approach to the economic analysis of transport 
policy and implementation issues. 
 
This issue is mostly focussed on the optimal pricing of existing urban infrastructures. It 
appears, however, that implementation of road pricing is more acceptable when it is limited to 
new links, and when new investments are paid by new tolls put in place. That is, users are 
prepared to pay for new services but not for services that were previously free. This raises the 
important question of the optimal use of the revenues of road pricing, and whether these 
revenues need to be hypothecated either to the mode from which they are collected or to the 
wider transport sector. These new issues are discussed in a collection of articles in de Palma, 
Lindsey and Proost (2006) that deals specifically with the optimal use of transport charges for 
investments or other purposes. 
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